Obtaining Jurisdiction Over States in
Bankruptcy Proceedings After Seminole Tribe
Teresa K Goebelt
Seminole Tribe of Florida v Florida,1 marked a dramatic
change in the Supreme Court's Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence, holding that Congress may not abrogate states' Eleventh
Amendment immunity from suit in federal court pursuant to its
powers under Article I. Seminole Tribe has sweeping implications
because it renders unconstitutional every federal statute that
was enacted under Congress's Article I powers and purports to
abrogate states' Eleventh Amendment immunity. As Justice
Stevens cautioned in his dissenting opinion, the decision "prevents Congress from providing a federal forum for a broad range
of actions against States, from those sounding in copyright and
patent law, to those concerning bankruptcy, environmental law,
and the regulation of our vast national economy.'
Justice Stevens's warning merits serious analysis in the
bankruptcy context. Section 106 of the Bankruptcy Code,4 which
purports to abrogate states' immunity from suit in several circumstances, eliminated most barriers to a bankruptcy court's assertion of jurisdiction over a state. Because Section 106 was enacted under Congress's Article I powers, however, Seminole Tribe
re-establishes these barriers by rendering its blanket abrogation
unconstitutional. As a result, states now may invoke their Eleventh Amendment immunity in many factual scenarios where a
bankruptcy trustee wants to involve the state in bankruptcy proceedings. For example, a trustee might allege that the state
breached a contract to construct public highways, claim a tax refund from the state, or bring other tort or statutory claims
against the state, including claims arising under the Bankruptcy
Code. When an estate in bankruptcy has meritorious claims
against the state, recovery on these claims will help creditors by
t A.B. 1994, Brown University; J.D. Candidate 1999, The University of Chicago.
517 US 44, 72-73 (1996).
2 The Eleventh Amendment provides: "The Judicial power of the United States shall
not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against
one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any
Foreign State." US Const, Amend X.
Seminole Tribe, 517 US at 77 (Stevens dissenting).
4
11 USC § 106 (1994).
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increasing the estate's assets. If the state invokes Eleventh
Amendment immunity, however, the bankruptcy court may not
be able to obtain jurisdiction over the state. Without such jurisdiction, the trustee cannot institute actions against the state in
bankruptcy court-likely precluding recovery of these claims.
Justice Stevens's warning suggests that state immunity from
bankruptcy proceedings may be a threat to the twin goals of the
Bankruptcy Code: (1) maximization and equitable distribution of
the assets of the bankruptcy estate and (2) a fresh starte for the
debtor. Indeed, there are numerous situations where this immunity could conceivably impair the bankruptcy process. With respect to the goal of maximizing the assets of the estate, if a bankruptcy court cannot force a state to turn over to the bankruptcy
trustee property obtained as a preferential transfer,' or fraudulent conveyance, or in violation of the automatic stay,8 the creditors will recover fewer assets. Also, if a bankruptcy court does not
have jurisdiction over a state to enforce the discharge of the debts
of the debtor,9 a state may continue collection efforts against a
debtor after a discharge, precluding a fresh start.
However, while Seminole Tribe may cause the loss of some
efficiencies in the bankruptcy process, this Comment argues that
it will not seriously impair the bankruptcy system's ability to
achieve its twin goals. Bankruptcy courts have a number of tools
they can use to mitigate the effects of states' invocation of their
Eleventh Amendment immunity, including waiver by the state
and the Ex parte Young doctrine, 10 which allows suits against
state officials in federal court. These mechanisms alleviate concerns that Seminole Tribe will severely compromise the bankruptcy process. In fact, there is only one conceivable situation
where bankruptcy courts' lack of jurisdiction over states could result in both failure to maximize the assets of the bankruptcy estate and inequitable distribution: if they were unable to force
states to turn over property obtained in a fraudulent conveyance
"'Fresh
start" is the policy through which a debtor is discharged by the bankruptcy
court from paying his prepetition debts. Fresh start policies apply only to individuals; corporate debtors get no discharge in ordinary bankruptcy proceedings, 11 USC § 727(a)(1)
(1994), and the discharge in Chapter 11, 11 USC § 1141 (1994), consummates the exchange of old claims for new claims. See Thomas H. Jackson and Robert E. Scott, On the
Nature of Bankruptcy:An Essay on Bankruptcy Sharingand the Creditors'Bargain,75 Va
L Rev 155, 156 n 3 (1989).
6 11 USC § 547 (1994).
11 USC § 548 (1994).
11 USC § 362 (1994).
" The Bankruptcy Code provisions relating to discharge are 11 USC §§ 727, 1141,
1228(a)-(b), 1328(b) (1994).
" 209 US 123 (1908).
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or preferential transfer. However, this inability does not pose a
serious threat to the bankruptcy process because states are not
likely to have the resources and information necessary to collect
debts aggressively prior to a debtor's bankruptcy filing.
Part I of this Comment provides a brief overview of the Supreme Court's Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence, including a
discussion of the Ex parte Young doctrine. Part II discusses
Seminole Tribe's immediate implications for the Bankruptcy Code
and concludes that Congress's blanket abrogation of Eleventh
Amendment immunity in Section 106 of the Bankruptcy Code is
unconstitutional. Part III examines the constitutional requirements for, and scope of, state waivers of Eleventh Amendment
immunity. It argues that when a state files a proof of claim, it
waives its Eleventh Amendment immunity with respect to claims
of the debtor against it arising from the same transaction or occurrence. Finally, Part IV explores the various situations in
which states' Eleventh Amendment immunity threatens to undermine the Bankruptcy Code's twin goals of equitable distribution and fresh start, where the state has not waived its immunity.
I.

ELEVENTH AMENDMENT IMMUNITY

A. Development of Eleventh Amendment Immunity
In the 1793 case of Chisholm v Georgia,1 the Supreme Court
allowed a citizen of South Carolina to sue the state of Georgia for
monetary damages. 2 Chisholm "literally shocked the Nation," in
Chief Justice Rehnquist's words, because the Framers had disclaimed that a federal court could have jurisdiction over a state in
light of the common law doctrine of sovereign immunity. 3 In response to Chisholm, the states quickly ratified the Eleventh
Amendment, which deprives federal courts of jurisdiction over
suits against states by citizens of another state.'4 Although schol"2 US (2 Dall) 419 (1793).
The Court reasoned: "aI]f sovereignty be an exemption from suit in any other than
the sovereign's own Courts, it follows that when a State, by adopting the Constitution, has
agreed to be amenable to the judicial power of the United States, she has, in that respect,
given up her right ofsovereignty." Id at 452.
" Edelman v Jordan,415 US 651, 662 (1974) (discussing the passage of the Eleventh
Amendment in response to Chisholm).
14 The Supreme Court has consistently held that an unconsenting state is immune
from suits brought in federal court by its own citizens as well as citizens of another state.
See Hans v Louisiana,134 US 1, 9-10, 14-15 (1890). However, the Supreme Court has long
recognized that municipalities and counties are outside the protection of the Eleventh
Amendment and thus are subject to the congressional abrogation of any state law immunities they may enjoy. See Mt. Healthy City School DistrictBoard of Education v Doyle,
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ars have expressed differing views on the Framers' intended
scope of the Eleventh Amendment, 5 the Supreme Court has held
that the Eleventh Amendment is a constitutional limitation on
the federal courts' subject matter jurisdiction in both diversity
and federal question cases. 6 According to the Court, "the [Eleventh] Amendment . . . is a specific constitutional bar against
hearing even federal claims that otherwise would be within the
jurisdiction of the federal courts.""
One consequence of the Eleventh Amendment would seem to
be that absent federal jurisdiction over states, states could violate
with impunity the Constitution and federal law, because, even if
a state violated the Constitution, federal courts would be powerless to hold the state accountable. The Supreme Court developed
the Ex parte Young doctrine to address this problem.
B.

The Exparte Young Doctrine

The Ex parte Young doctrine allows a party to sue a state official to enjoin a violation of federal law or the Constitution, even
when the Eleventh Amendment bars suit against the state itself. 8 In Ex parte Young, 9 shareholders of a railroad company
sought to bring an action in federal court to enjoin the Attorney
General of Minnesota from enforcing a statute fixing the rates
that the railroad could charge. The stockholders alleged that the
429 US 274, 280-81 (1977) (holding that a school board is more like a city than a state and
therefore has no Eleventh Amendment immunity); Lincoln County v Luning, 133 US 529,
530 (1890) (holding that only states, not counties, receive Eleventh Amendment immunity). The federal government can bring suit in federal court against a state. UnitedStates
v Texas, 143 US 621, 644-45 (1892) (finding such power necessary to the "permanence of
the Union"). For a more extensive discussion of the history of the Eleventh Amendment,
see Doyle Mathis, The Eleventh Amendment:Adoption and Interpretation,.2 Ga L Rev 207,
215-30 (1968); John J. Gibbons, The Eleventh Amendment and State Sovereign Immunity:
A Reinterpretation,83 Colum L Rev 1889, 1890-1941 (1983).
" For a defense of the view that the Eleventh Amendment reinstated common law
sovereign immunity after Chisholm and therefore allows for congressional abrogation, see
Martha A. Field, The Eleventh Amendment and Other Sovereign Immunity Doctrines:Part
One, 126 U Pa L Rev 515, 538 (1978); Laurence Tribe, Intergovernmental Immunities in
Litigation, Taxation, and Regulation: Separationof Powers Issues in Controversies about
Federalism, 89 Harv L Rev 682, 693-99 (1976). For a discussion of the view that the Eleventh Amendment applies to diversity, but not federal question, jurisdiction, see Gibbons,
83 Colum L Rev at 1892-1927; William A. Fletcher, A HistoricalInterpretationof the Eleventh Amendment: A Narrow Construction of an Affirmative Grant of JurisdictionRather
than a ProhibitionAgainst Jurisdiction,35 Stan L Rev 1033, 1060-63 (1983).
"See PennhurstState School and Hospitalv Halderman,465 US 89, 119-21 (1984).
" Id at 120.
1' For a history of the development of the Ex parte Young doctrine through the Supreme Courts 1984 decision in Pennhurst,see David P. Currie, Sovereign Immunity and
Suits Against Government Officers, 1984 S Ct Rev 149.
"209 US 123, 129-30 (1908).
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rates were set so high as to deprive them of property without due
process of law, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of the
Constitution.' The Court held that the federal courts had jurisdiction over the Attorney General, distinguishing a suit against a
state official from a suit against a state.21 The Court reasoned:
If the act which the state Attorney General seeks to enforce
be a violation of the Federal Constitution, the officer in proceeding under such enactment comes into conflict with the
superior authority of that Constitution, and he is in that case
stripped of his official or representative character and is
subjected in his person to the consequences of his individual
conduct. The State has no power to impart to him any immunity from responsibility to the supreme authority of the
United States.22
While Ex parte Young itself involved a violation of the Constitution, the Court has applied it to violations of federal law as well.'
The Supreme Court has limited Ex parte Young to actions for
prospective injunctive relief; the doctrine does not allow a suit
against a state official for recovery of money damages.' As the
Court has explained:
Both prospective and retrospective relief implicate Eleventh
Amendment concerns, but the availability of prospective relief of the sort awarded in Ex parte Young gives life to the
Supremacy Clause. Remedies designed to end a continuing
violation of federal law are necessary to vindicate the federal
interest in assuring the supremacy of that law.... But compensatory or deterrence interests are insufficient to overcome the dictates of the Eleventh Amendment.'
However, the Supreme Court has permitted plaintiffs in Ex parte
Young actions to recover attorneys' fees on the theory that those
Id.
Id at 159-60.

"Id.
See, for example, Edelman, 415 US at 664 (involving compliance with federal rules
for processing welfare applications).
See, for example, Edelman, 415 US at 665-69 (refusing to retroactively award benefits that had been withheld from recipients in violation of federal law because the funds to
satisfy such an award would come from the state's general revenues); Ford Motor Co v Departmentof Treasury ofIndiana, 323 US 459, 464 (1945) (holding that "when the action is
in essence one for the recovery of money from the state, the state is the real, substantial
party in interest and is entitled to invoke its sovereign immunity from suit even though
individual officials are nominal defendants").
Green v Mansour, 474 US 64, 68 (1985) (citations omitted) (refusing to require the
state to give notice to citizens whose benefits were withheld by a state in violation of federal law).
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fees are ancillary to the bringing of the action.26 In Seminole
Tribe, the Court further narrowed the Ex parte Young doctrine to
instances where Congress has not established a detailed scheme
for remedying violations of federal law."
If a federal court enjoins a state official from violating a federal law under Ex parte Young and that official violates the injunction, the court may issue a contempt order against that official. Because the initial Ex parte Young action establishes federal
jurisdiction over the state official, the court can then impose
monetary or other contempt penalties on the official." As the Supreme Court explained in Hutto v Finney:'
In exercising their prospective powers under Ex parte Young
and Edelman v Jordan,federal courts are not reduced to issuing injunctions against state officers and hoping for compliance. Once issued, an injunction may be enforced.... Civil
contempt may also be punished by a remedial fine, which
compensates the party who won the injunction for the effects
of his opponent's noncompliance. 0

See Missouri v Jenkins, 491 US 274, 280-81 (1989) (awarding attorneys' fees in civil
rights action); Hutto v Finney, 437 US 678, 695 (1978) ("[Attorneys' fees] have traditionally been awarded without regard for the States' Eleventh Amendment immunity.").
"Seminole Tribe, 517 US at 73-75. The Court found that Congress had established
such a remedial scheme in Seminole Tribe, and accordingly denied the federal court jurisdiction over the state official. Id. The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 25 USC §§ 2701-21
(1994), provides that if a state fails to negotiate in good faith with the Indian tribe, the
only remedy is a court order directing the tribe and the state to agree on a compact within
a certain time period. If the parties disregard that order, the only sanction is that each
party must submit a proposal to a mediator. Finally, if the state refuses to accept the proposal selected by the mediator, the only sanction is that the mediator shall notify the Secretary of the Interior, who then must develop regulations to govern the issue. In light of
this detailed remedial scheme, the Court rejected the idea that Congress intended to
authorize Exparte Young actions under the Act. "By contrast with this quite modest set of
sanctions, an action brought against a state official under Ex parte Young would expose
that official to the full remedial powers of a federal court... ." Id at 75.
' For this reason; courts cannot issue standing injunctions against state a6tors' violations of federal law (for example, a violation of the automatic stay in bankruptcy). In order
to obtain jurisdiction over the state actor to issue such an injunction, Ex parte Young requires an antecedent violation of federal law. Only after a court establishes jurisdiction
under Ex parte Young can it exercise its full contempt power. In one pre-Seminole Tribe
bankruptcy case, however, a court allowed the debtor to recover damages for violation of
the automatic stay by a state agency without first enjoining the official in an Ex parte
Young action, conceiving of the initial violation as contempt of court. See In re Colon, 114
Bankr 890, 898 (Bankr E D Pa 1990). Such a conception, however, ignores the antecedent
need of the bankruptcy court to acquire jurisdiction over the state official before awarding
damages. The court could have issued an order against the state official in an Ex parte
Young action, enjoining future violations of the automatic stay, if the state official violated
that order, contempt damages would be appropriate.
2437
US 678 (1978).
Id at 690-91.
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The award of damages under the contempt power is distinct from
any award of damages for the underlying violation of federal law;
the latter is prohibited by the Ex parteYoung doctrine.
The remainder of this Comment considers the impact of
Eleventh Amendment immunity and the Ex parte Young doctrine
in the bankruptcy context in light of Seminole Tribe. A general
theme emerges: what Seminole Tribe takes away from bankruptcy courts' jurisdiction over states that violate provisions of
the Bankruptcy Code, the Ex parte Young doctrine replenishes to
a substantial extent by allowing bankruptcy courts to assert jurisdiction over the state officials to enjoin those violations.
II. ABROGATION OF ELEVENTH AMENDMENT IMMUNITY
The first step in examining the impact of Seminole Tribe on
the bankruptcy system is to evaluate the constitutionality of Section 106, 1' the key provision of the Bankruptcy Code relating to
bankruptcy courts' ability to assert jurisdiction over a state. Section 106(a) provides for a blanket abrogation of states' Eleventh
Amendment immunity with respect to numerous provisions of the
11 USC § 106 provides:
(a) Notwithstanding an assertion of sovereign immunity, sovereign immunity is abrogated as to a governmental unit to the extent set forth in this section with respect to
the following.
(1) [Enumerates sections]
(2) The court may hear and determine any issue arising with respect to the application of such sections to governmental units.
(3) The court may issue against such governmental unit an order, process, or
judgment under such sections or the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, including an order or judgment awarding a money recovery, but not including an
award of punitive damages. Such order or judgment for costs and fees under this
title or the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure against any governmental
unit shall be consistent with the provisions and limitations of section
2412(dX2)(A) of title 28.
(4) The enforcement of any such order, process, or judgment against any governmental unit shall be consistent with appropriate nonbankruptcy law applicable to such governmental unit and, in the case of a money judgment against the
United States, shall be paid as if it is a judgment rendered by a district court of
the United States.
(5) Nothing in this section shall create any substantive claim for relief or cause
of action not otherwise existing under this title, the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy
Procedure, or nonbankruptey law.
(b) A governmental unit that has filed a proof of claim in the case is deemed to have
waived sovereign immunity with respect to a claim against such governmental unit
that is property ofthe estate and that arose out of the same transaction or occurrence
out of which the claim of such governmental unit arose.
(c) Notwithstanding any assertion of sovereign immunity by a governmental unit,
there shall be offset against a claim or interest of a governmental unit any claim
against such governmental unit that is property ofthe estate.
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Bankruptcy Code. Section 106(b) provides that states filing a
proof of claim in the bankruptcy court waive their immunity with
respect to claims by the trustee arising out of the same transaction or occurrence. Section 106(c) abrogates immunity with respect to offsetting claims of the trustee against claims of the
state. To the extent Section 106 purports to abrogate a state's
Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit, it will survive constitutional attack under Seminole Tribe only if Congress enacted it
pursuant to its powers under Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment, which the Supreme Court held was a valid source of
abrogation.32
This Part first explains in more detail the Seminole Tribe
holding and its relation to Congress's Article I powers. It then
considers whether Congress enacted the Bankruptcy Code pursuant to its Fourteenth Amendment powers, and whether in any
case Congress has the power under Section 5 to enact a bankruptcy law.
A.

Seminole Tribe, Article I, and Section 106

If Congress enacted Section 106 pursuant to its Article I
power to establish uniform laws on bankruptcy, Seminole Tribe
instructs that its blanket abrogation of Eleventh Amendment
immunity is unconstitutional as applied to states.' Although
Seminole Tribe3 5 involved Congress's power under the Indian
Commerce Clause of Article I,36 the majority opinion left no doubt
that its holding applied to all Article I powers: "The Eleventh
Amendment restricts the judicial power under Article III, and Article I cannot be used to circumvent the constitutional limitations
placed upon federal jurisdiction."
Section 106(a) abrogates a governmental unit's sovereign
immunity with respect to certain sections of the Code and allows

See Seminole Tribe, 517 US at 59.

US Const, Art I, § 8, cl 4.
Section 106 does not refer specifically to states; it refers instead to "governmental
units." 11 USC § 106. 11 USC § 101(27) (1994) defines "governmental units" to include
states. Seminole Tribe does not impact the sovereign immunity of the federal government
or any government unit except those protected by the Eleventh Amendment.
"517 US at 63-66, overruling the plurality decision in Pennsylvania v Union Gas Co
491 US 1, 19 (1989) (holding that Congress could abrogate states' Eleventh Amendment
immunity when legislating pursuant to the Interstate Commerce Clause, US Const, Art I,
§ 8, cl 3). In his dissent in Union Gas, which foreshadowed the Seminole Tribe decision,
Justice Scalia asserted that Congress could not abrogate states' Eleventh Amendment
immunity pursuant to its Article I powers. Union Gas, 491 US at 42 (Scalia dissenting).
US Const, Art I, § 8, cl 3.
Seminole Tribe, 517 US at 72-73.
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the bankruptcy court to issue judgments against states, including
for recovery of monetary claims."5 Because it is an express abrogation of immunity by Congress, its application to states is rendered unconstitutional by Seminole Tribe.
The analysis of Sections 106(b) and (c) is similar. Section
106(b) provides that when a state files a proof of claim in a bankruptcy proceeding, it waives its immunity with respect to claims
by the trustee against it arising from the same transaction or occurrence as the proof of claim. 9 Section 106(c) provides for an offset against a claim by a state for any claim of the debtor or the
trustee against that state.4" While not providing for a blanket abrogation of states' Eleventh Amendment immunity as Section
106(a) does, Sections 106(b) and (c) represent efforts by Congress
to define a waiver of immunity. Seminole Tribe established that
the parameters of waiver are constitutional; just as Congress has
no power to abrogate a state's Eleventh Amendment immunity,
Congress cannot determine the circumstances in which a state
waives its immunity beyond constitutional parameters. As one
bankruptcy court observed, "insofar as Congress undertook in []
§§ 106(b) and (c) to displace or to modify the meaning ascribed to
the Eleventh Amendment by the courts, its endeavor must be
deemed an
attempted abrogation of the states' constitutional im41
munity."
The "same transaction or occurrence" test should be the constitutional test of waiver by a state of its Eleventh Amendment
immunity. 42 To the extent that Section 106(b) comports with this
test, it is constitutional.4 3 Section 106(c), however, seeks to define
waiver beyond that constitutional test, and thus is unconstitutional.

= For the text of 11 USC § 106(a), see note 31.
For the text of 11 USC § 106(b), see note 31.
For the text of 11 USC § 106(c), see note 31.
41 In re NVR LP, 206 Bankr 831, 839 (Bankr E D Va 1997).
U
4'

See Part III.B.2.
See In re CharterOak Associates, 203 Bankr 17, 21-22 (Bankr D Conn 1996) (bolding Section 106(c) constitutional as well). One court has found Section 106(b) unconstitutional, even while adopting the same transaction or occurrence test. In re Creative Goldsmiths of Washington,D.C., Inc, 119 F3d 1140, 114748 (4th Cir 1997). The court reasoned
that any attempt by Congress to abrogate immunity by defining the circumstances that
constitute a waiver is unconstitutional. Id. Another court has expressed a similar concern,
noting that "the power to define waiver can become the functional equivalent of the power
to abrogate." AER-Aerotron, Inc v Texas Departmentof Transportation,104 F3d 677, 681
(4th Cir 1997) (declining to rule on the constitutionality of Section 106).

920

The University of ChicagoLaw Review

[65:911

B. Seminole Tribe, the Fourteenth Amendment, and Section 106
The vast majority of courts that have considered the issue
since Seminole Tribe have found that Section 106(a) is unconstitutional because it was enacted pursuant to Article I. The only
courts that have held that Section 106 constitutionally abrogates
states' sovereign immunity have concluded that the Bankruptcy
Code was enacted pursuant to Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment 45 -which is recognized by the Seminole Tribe Court
as a valid source of congressional power to abrogate states' Eleventh Amendment immunity.46
This reasoning, however, clearly contravenes the Supreme
Court's interpretation of Congress's powers under the Fourteenth
Amendment. First, the Court has held that it will not impute to
Congress the intent to enact legislation pursuant to its Fourteenth Amendment power absent a clear congressional statement
of such intent;47 the Bankruptcy Code contains no such statement. Moreover, Congress does not have the constitutional power
to enact the Bankruptcy Code pursuant to its Fourteenth
Amendment powers. The Supreme Court has recognized that the
Fourteenth Amendment does not grant Congress a plenary
power, but instead grants only a power to achieve the remedial
ends advanced by the Fourteenth Amendment itself, namely the
eradication of discrimination.4" The Bankruptcy Code does not
serve any such remedial goal. The fact that Article I explicitly

" See, for example, In re Kish, 212 Bankr 808, 815 (D NJ 1997); In re Martinez, 196
Bankr 225, 230 (D Puerto Rico 1996); In re Mueller, 211 Bankr 737, 741-42 (Bankr D Mont
1997); In re NVR, 206 Bankr at 837-38; In re York-Hannover Developments, Inc, 201
Bankr 137, 140-41 (Bankr E D NC 1996); In re Midland Mechanical Contractors,Inc, 200
Bankr 453,457-58 (Bankr N D Ga 1996).
"See, for example, In re Straight, 209 Bankr 540, 555 (D Wyo 1997) (concluding that
application of the Fourteenth Amendment to Section 106 renders it constitutional, but
noting the need for clarification from higher courts); In re Headrick, 200 Bankr 963, 967
(Bankr S D Ga 1996) ("Article I gives Congress the power to legislate on the subject of
bankruptcy, and the Fourteenth Amendment allows debtors to enforce the provisions of
the Bankruptcy Code in federal court notwithstanding the States' Eleventh Amendment
immunity.-).
Seminole Tribe, 517 US at 59.
"See PennhurstState School and Hospitalv Halderman, 451 US 1, 16 (1981), reaffd,
465 US 89 (1984) (stating that, absent a plain statement, "we should not ... attribute to
Congress an unstated intent to act under its authority to enforce the Fourteenth Amendmenrt").
"See City of Boerne v Flores, 117 S Ct 2157, 2167-68 (1997) ("Any suggestion that
Congress has a substantive, non-remedial power under the Fourteenth Amendment is not
supported by our case law."). The Supreme Court has limited the remedial ends of the
Fourteenth Amendment to "the mischief and wrong which the [A]mendment was intended
to provide against." The Civil Rights Cases, 109 US 3, 13 (1883), quoted in City of Boerne,
117 S Ct at 2170.
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confers on Congress the power to enact a bankruptcy law49 further undermines the contention that Congress enacted the Bankruptcy Code pursuant to Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. °
In short, the argument for upholding the constitutionality of
the blanket abrogation of Section 106 fails to persuade. The
Bankruptcy Code, of which Section 106 is a part, was undoubtedly enacted pursuant to Congress's powers under the Bankruptcy Clause of Article I. Even if Congress wanted to, it could
not shore up the constitutionality of Section 106 by reenacting
the Code pursuant to its powers under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Given the constitutional invalidity of the
blanket abrogation of Section 106, bankruptcy courts must employ other means of keeping states within the reach of the bankruptcy system. The next two Parts consider two doctrines that
have that potential: waiver of immunity and Ex parte Young.
HI.

WAIVER OF ELEVENTH AMENDMENT IMMUNITY

The Supreme Court has long interpreted the Eleventh
Amendment to allow states to consent to actions in federal court
from which they would otherwise be immune.5 1 Such waiver mitigates to some extent Congress's inability to abrogate states' immunity. There are two types of waiver: explicit and constructive.5 2
A. Explicit Waiver
A state may waive its Eleventh Amendment immunity by
expressly agreeing to be sued in federal court. The Supreme
Court has held that "[t]he test for determining whether a State
has waived its immunity from federal-court jurisdiction is a
" US Const, Art I, § 8, cl 4.
= For a more extended discussion of the arguments for and against the contention that
Congress enacted the Bankruptcy Code pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment, see In re
Creative Goldsmiths, 119 F3d at 114547 (concluding that Congress did not enact the
Bankruptcy Code pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment); In re AVR, 206 Bankr at 83943 (same).
" See, for example, Atascadero State Hospital v Scanlon, 473 US 234, 238 (1985);
Clark v Barnard,108 US 436, 447 (1883).
As a prerequisite to finding that a state has waived its immunity, a court must determine whether the state official who took such actions had the authority to waive the
Eleventh Amendment immunity of the state, a finding that depends on state law. See, for
example, Ford Motor Co, 323 US at 467 (holding that state law did not authorize waiving
immunity on a case by case basis); MaineAssociation of InterdependentNeighborhoods v
Petit, 659 F Supp 1309, 1315 (D Me 1987) (holding that waiver is ineffective if the state officer is not authorized to waive immunity). See Mark Browning, Who Can Waive State
Immunity?, 15 Am Bankr Inst J 10 (1997), for a discussion of how to determine the
authority of state officials to waive.
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stringent one." 3 Courts will find an explicit waiver only where
the state has stated its intent to waive "by the most express language or by such overwhelming implication from the text as [will]
leave no room for any other reasonable construction. " For example, a state may waive its Eleventh Amendment immunity
with respect to certain claims by so providing in its Constitution,
a statute,55 or a contract.5 6 However, a state does not waive its
Eleventh Amendment immunity merely by receiving federal
funds under a federal statute5 7 or agreeing to be bound by the requirements of the federal Medicaid Act.5" As Professor Erwin
Chemerinsky has observed, "the Supreme Court's test is so stringent that it is quite unlikely that very many explicit state waivers of Eleventh Amendment immunity will be found."59
B. Constructive Waiver
In addition to explicitly waiving its Eleventh Amendment
immunity, a state may waive its immunity constructively. The
Supreme Court has not yet comprehensively defined the requirements and boundaries of constructive waiver in the bankruptcy
context, but some guidance is provided by Gardner v New Jersey.' In Gardner,the Supreme Court held that when a state files
a proof of claim against a debtor,6 the state waives any immunity
it may have had with respect to adjudication of that particular
claim-that is, any defensive counterclaim by the debtor. 2 The
Court reasoned that "[i]f the claimant is a State, the procedure of
"Atascadero, 473 US at 241. See John Evans Taylor, Note, Express Waiver of Eleventh Amendment Immunity, 17 Ga L Rev 513, 524-26 (1983), for a more extensive discussion of the Supreme Court's requirements for finding an explicit waiver.
"Edelman, 415 US at 673, quoting Murray v Wilson Distilling Co, 213 US 151, 171
(1909).
However, a statute or constitutional provision authorizing the state to be sued in
"any court of competent jurisdiction" does not constitute a waiver of Eleventh Amendment
immunity. See Kennecott Copper Corp v State Tax Commission, 327 US 573, 578-80
(1946). Nor does a provision evidencing the state's consent to be sued in its state courts
indicate Eleventh Amendment waiver. See FloridaDepartment of Health and Rehabilitative Services v FloridaNursingHome Association, 450 US 147, 149-50 (1981).
"See Petty v Tennessee-Missouri Bridge Commission, 359 US 275, 281-82 (1959)
(holding that provision in compact between two states allowing the bi-state commission to
sue and be sued in its own name constitute a waiver by the commission).
See Atascadero, 473 US at 246-47 (involving the Rehabilitation Act of 1973).
See FloridaDepartment,450 US at 149-50.
Erwin Chemerinsky, Federal Jurisdiction§ 7.6 at 358 (Little, Brown 1989).
329 US 565 (1947).
"Generally, an unsecured creditor must file a proof of claim with the bankruptcy
court in order for the claim to be considered. FRBrP 3002(a). Generally, secured creditors
do not have to file proofs of claim, as their collateral evidences their claim. FRBrP 3002
advisory committee note.
"Gardner, 329 US at 573-74.
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proof and allowance is not transmitted into a suit against the
State because the court entertains objections to the claim. The
State is seeking something from the debtor. No judgment is
sought against the State.'
The Court has not, however, identified other situations in
which a waiver may be found. Lower courts have used two methods for finding constructive waiver: the defensive counterclaim
test of Gardnerand the same transaction or occurrence test.64 The
bankruptcy policy of achieving the twin goals supports adopting
the same transaction or occurrence test for identifying constructive waivers, and the test does not unduly undermine federalism
concerns.
1.

The defensive counterclaim test.

Some courts have adopted the defensive counterclaim test
recognized by the Supreme Court in Gardnerto define the constitutional requirements of waiver." Under this test, bankruptcy
courts have very limited jurisdiction: they may adjudicate only
those claims by the trustee that relate to the adjudication of the
state's claim against the bankruptcy estate. One court justified
this test as "comport[ing] more with the tendency of modern
Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence to disfavor finding that a
broad waiver has been effected." s
2.

The same transaction or occurrence test.

The majority of courts holding the blanket abrogation provisions of Section 106 unconstitutional under Seminole Tribe have
allowed federal court jurisdiction over all claims that arise out of
the same transaction or occurrence as the claim filed by the state,
declining to limit the scope of the waiver to defensive counterclaims." This same transaction or occurrence test derives from
' Id. The Court also asserted that "[ilt is traditional bankruptcy law that he who invokes the aid of the bankruptcy court by offering a proof of claim and demanding its allowance must abide by the consequences of that procedure.' Id at 573.
See, for example, In re NVR, 206 Bankr at 851 (adopting the defensive counterclaim
test); In re Creative Goldsmiths, 119 F3d at 1148 (adopting the same transaction or occurrence test).
"See, for example, In re C.J.Rogers, Inc, 212 Bankr 265, 274-75 (E D Mich 1997); In
re NVR, 206 Bankr at 851.
In reNVR, 206 Bankr at 851.
See In re Creative Goldsmiths, 119 F3d at 1148 (holding that the state has waived
immunity with respect to any claim filed in response to a state's proof of claim that
amounts to a compulsory counterclaim); In re Koehler, 204 Bankr 210, 221 (Bankr D Min
1997). Courts that have found Section 106(b) constitutional also use the same transaction
or occurrence test, but they have relied on the statutory text and have not considered con-
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Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 13(a), which defines the scope of
compulsory counterclaims-those claims that a party must assert
in the pending action.s
Courts outside of the bankruptcy context generally interpret
the test "liberally. 9 In determining whether the claim arose out
of the same transaction or occurrence, courts use the "logical relation" standard. 0 When this standard is applied in the bankruptcy
context, jurisdiction exists over claims that have a logical relation
to the subject matter of the proof of claim filed by the state.7" For
example, a proof of claim filed by the state department of revenue
for collection of taxes from the debtor is logically related to a
claim by the trustee that the state violated the automatic stay to
collect these taxes. The proof of claim is not logically related,
however, to a claim by the trustee for reimbursement from the
state department of health for Medicare services provided by the
debtor. The latter claim involves a different state party and a different set of events than the proof of claim.
The distinction between the defensive counterclaim test and
the same transaction or occurrence test, which may appear insignificant, proves dispositive in some cases. For example, in In re
Lazar," California filed a proof of claim for unpaid taxes, a portion of which related to taxes payable to the Underground Storage Tank Cleanup Fund. The fund used taxes it collected to reimburse owners of underground storage tanks for costs of cleaning
up any leaks. The bankruptcy trustee brought an action in bankruptcy court to litigate the denial of claims by the debtors for
reimbursement from the fund, which were made prior to the
bankruptcy filing. The court, applying the same transaction or occurrence test, found a logical relationship between the proof of
claim for unpaid taxes for the fund and the trustee's action
against the fund, and accordingly held that California had waived
its Eleventh Amendment immunity with respect to the trustee's
action." In contrast, if the court had applied the defensive counterclaim test, it would not have allowed the trustee's action bestitutional concerns. See In re CharterOak, 203 Bankr at 23; In re Lazar, 200 Bankr 358,
377 (Bankr C D Cal 1996).
68 FRCP 13(a) provides: "A pleading shall state as a counterclaim any claim which at
the time of serving the pleading the pleader has against any opposing party, if it arises out
of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter ofthe opposing party's claim...."
' See Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R.Miller, and Mary Kay Kane, 6 FederalPractice
and Procedure§ 1410 at 50 (West 2d ed 1990).
Id at 65.
See, for example, In re Lazar, 200 Bankr at 378.
200 Bankr 358, 364 (Bankr C D Cal 1996).
Id at 364-66, 379.
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cause adjudication of the claim for unpaid taxes did not require
consideration of the trustee's claim against the fund for payments
owed to the debtors. The court could have determined what taxes
were owed to the fund without deciding whether payments for
pre-bankruptcy environmental cleanup were due to the bankruptcy estate. Indeed, this result illustrates the potential unfairness of the defensive counterclaim test: California could consent
to jurisdiction to get its share of the bankruptcy estate, but could
deny the court jurisdiction over it to determine if it owed money
to the estate. As a result, California could receive a disproportionate share of the estate, harming other creditors.
3.

Justification for adoption of the same transaction or
occurrence test.

Courts should adopt the same transaction or occurrence test
to identify constructive waiver. This test is superior to the defensive counterclaim test because it better serves important policy
goals of the bankruptcy system while still respecting the federalism concerns underlying the Eleventh Amendment.
First, the same transaction or occurrence test is consistent
with Supreme Court jurisprudence. The Gardner Court held that
the defensive counterclaim rule was constitutional,74 but did not
foreclose the possibility that a broader test may be constitutional.
Indeed, the same transaction or occurrence test satisfies a primary concern animating the Seminole Tribe decision: when a
state files a proof of claim, there is little need for concern regarding the 'indignity of subjecting a State to the coercive process of judicial tribunals at the instance of private parties."75 The
test respects a state's desire not to participate in federal court
proceedings, while also limiting a state's exposure to such proceedings to when it does decide to participate. 6
7,329 US at 574.
"Seminole Tribe, 517 US at 58, quoting Puerto Rico Aqueduct and Sewer Authority v
Metcalf and Eddy, Inc, 506 US 139, 146 (1993), quoting In re Ayers, 123 US 443, 505
(1887).
" Some courts have found that the filing of a proof of claim by one state agency constitutes a waiver of Eleventh Amendment immunity for all state agencies. See, for example,
In re Hughes-Bechtol, Inc, 124 Bankr 1007, 1018 (Bankr S D Ohio 1991). See also NJDept
Environ Protection v GloucesterEnviron Mgmt Services, Inc, 923 F Supp 651, 664 (D NJ
1995) (involving nonbankruptcy action). While serving policy goals of bankruptcy by allowing the adjudication of all claims in the bankruptcy court, this holding fails to strike an
appropriate balance between such policy goals and broader federalism concerns. A claim
by one state agency will not necessarily put a wholly unrelated state agency on notice that
its Eleventh Amendment immunity may have been waived. This raises Seminole Tribe's
concern about the "indignity" of subjecting a state to suit, and ignores the Supreme
Courts reluctance to find a waiver of immunity. Application of the same transaction or oc-
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Second, the same transaction or occurrence test will facilitate
the adjudication of all claims and obligations of the debtor in one
forum, the bankruptcy court. Both efficiency concerns (resolving
all disputes in one forum) and fairness concerns (ensuring that all
creditors receive an equitable distribution 77 ) suggest the desirability of adjudicating as many claims as constitutionally permissible in the bankruptcy court.
The facts of In re C.J.Rogers, Inc7" illustrate both the federalism and policy justifications for the same transaction or occurrence test. The Michigan Employment Security Agency ("MESA")
received, as an alleged preferential transfer,79 money from the
debtor's bank account to pay outstanding taxes. When the debtor
entered bankruptcy court, MESA filed proofs of claim for additional amounts owed. The trustee subsequently filed suit against
MESA, challenging the validity of the lien pursuant to which
MESA recovered the money from the debtor's bank account. Applying the defensive counterclaim test, the court held that it
lacked jurisdiction over MESA to adjudicate the trustee's claim."
This result seems unfair, for MESA consented to jurisdiction to
recover additional monies owed to it, but was able to take advantage of its immunity to retain a potentially preferential transfer.
The lack of jurisdiction thus allowed MESA to receive a disproportionate amount of the debtor's assets. The same transaction or
occurrence test would have allowed the bankruptcy trustee to recover the preferential transfer and distribute it to the rest of the
creditors-a more equitable result that would also have increased
the assets of the bankruptcy estate.
4.

Liberal application of same transaction or
occurrence test.

Bankruptcy courts should interpret the same transaction or
occurrence liberally in bankruptcy proceedings, as courts do in

currence test carefully circumscribes the exposure of the state to federal court jurisdiction;

the "one for all" standard allows for unlimited exposure once one state agency files a proof
of claim.
"This equitable distribution is one of the twin goals of the bankruptcy system. See
note 5 and accompanying text.
212 Bankr 265 (E D Mich 1997).
The Bankruptcy Code deems conveyances made within ninety days of the filing of a
bankruptcy petition preferential transfers; these transfers must be turned over to the
trustee. 11 USC § 547. 11 USC § 547(b)(4)(A) provides that preferential transfers made
within ninety days of filing may be voided. 11 USC § 550(a) provides that the trustee may
recover the transferred property.
' In re C.J. Rogers, 212 Bankr at 276.
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the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 13(a) context,81 "to facilitate
the adjustment of all obligations of a debtor in one forum." As
courts have recognized in the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
13(a) context, there is no technical definition of what constitutes
the same transaction or occurrence.' Because of this lack of precision, the courts in applying the test should balance the federalism concerns underlying Seminole Tribe and the twin goals of the
bankruptcy system: maximization and equitable distribution of
the assets of the bankruptcy estate and a fresh start for the
debtor.
With respect to federalism, if the state agency against whom
the debtor's claim is asserted filed a proof of claim, there is less
concern over the "indignity" of subjecting it to the jurisdiction of
the bankruptcy court; the state has already consented to-has
even requested-federal jurisdiction. However, if the debtor's
claim involves an entirely separate state agency than the one filing the proof of claim, the court should be more careful in finding
that jurisdiction exists, because that agency has not consented to
jurisdiction. In this situation, the courts should consider the relationship between the two agencies. For example, if the state department of revenue files a proof of claim for unpaid taxes, and
the trustee seeks to assert a claim against the state department
of health services for payment for services rendered, no relationship between the agencies seems to exist, so federalism concerns
militate against jurisdiction. On the other hand, the situation is
different if the state department of revenue agrees to collect
revenue and also makes payments on behalf of the state department of health services. In that case, a trustee should be allowed
to bring a suit against the department of health services if it relates to a proof of claim filed by the department of revenue. The
relationship between the agencies should put each on notice of
claims filed by the others relating to their agreement-and so
federalism concerns are respected.
On the policy side, courts should consider the importance of
adjudicating the debtor's claim in the bankruptcy court. When
application of the same transaction or occurrence test does not
yield clear results, the courts should examine the availability of
other avenues of relief for the debtor and the relative importance
of the claim to the bankruptcy estate. For example, if adjudication of a trustee's claim against a state would only minimally
See Wright, Miller, and Kane, 6 FederalPractice§ 1410 at 50 (cited in note 69).
In re Lazar, 200 Bankr at 379.
See Wright, Miller, and Kane, 6 FederalPractice§ 1410 at 52 (cited in note 69).
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augment the bankruptcy estate, or if the trustee could at low cost
adjudicate his claim in another forum such as state court, bankruptcy courts should be more hesitant before asserting jurisdiction.
A liberal application of the same transaction or occurrence
test would have resulted in a different outcome in In re Creative
Goldsmiths of Washington, D.C., Inc.' There, the bankruptcy

trustee sued the Maryland comptroller, seeking to avoid as a
preferential transfer the debtor's payment of income taxes to the
state. Maryland filed a proof of claim for sales and withholding
taxes, but not for the income taxes.' The court held that the action to recover the preferentially paid income taxes did not arise
out of the same transaction or occurrence as the payment of sales
and Withholding taxes, and so denied jurisdiction over the trustee's preference action. 6 This result allowed the comptroller to retain the preferential transfer by avoiding the jurisdiction of the
court, while seeking the jurisdiction of the same court to recover
assets from the bankruptcy estate. The state became in effect a
preferred creditor. A more liberal application of the same transaction or occurrence test, however, would lead to the opposite result. The court could have viewed the payment of income taxes to
Maryland as logically related to Maryland's claim for sales and
withholding taxes on the ground that both represent the obligation of the debtor to pay taxes relating to its business to the state.
Moreover, both involve the comptroller of Maryland; because the
comptroller agreed to the court's jurisdiction by filing a proof of
claim, there is less intrusion on federalism concerns in deeming a
waiver to have occurred. On the other hand, if Maryland's proof
of claim related to a contract with the debtor for Medicaid services, there would be no logical relationship between that proof of
claim and a refund of income taxes paid. Under the same transaction or occurrence test, the court would not have jurisdiction over
such a claim.
In short, the doctrine of waiver of Eleventh Amendment immunity-especially under the same transaction or occurrence
test-provides a foothold for the efforts of bankruptcy trustees
and courts to assert authority over states in the bankruptcy process, while also respecting federalism concerns. The waiver doctrine is unavailable if the state does not file a proof of claim;
moreover, even if the state does file a proof of claim, the same
119 F3d 1140 (4th Cir 1997).
"Id at 1143.
8 Id at 1149.
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transaction or occurrence test will not always be satisfied. The
next Part thus examines additional tools by which bankruptcy
courts can bring states into a bankruptcy proceeding, including
the Exparte Young doctrine.
IV. How COURTS SHOULD ADDRESS POTENTIAL OBSTACLES
PRESENTED BY SEMINOLE TRIBE

Debtors often seek to assert claims against a state in situations where the state has not filed a proof of claim or otherwise
waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity. This Part discusses
the options available to bankruptcy courts in four such scenarios:
(1) state attempts to collect debts after discharge by the bankruptcy court; (2) violation by the state of the automatic stay; (3)
the state's refusal to turn over preferential or fraudulent conveyances; and (4) claims for monetary recovery by the debtor against
the state. These four scenarios represent instances where the
Seminole Tribe holding may pose a serious threat to the bankruptcy process. However, because bankruptcy courts have a variety of tools with which to enjoin violations of the Bankruptcy
Code, Seminole Tribe does not in fact pose a serious threat to the
bankruptcy regime. The only conceivable area in which the debtor
has no recourse against the state is when the state has received
property of the debtor through preferential transfers. This does
not pose a serious threat to the bankruptcy process because it is
unlikely that states have the resources or information to accelerate aggressively their debt collection practices with respect to potential bankrupts.
A. Attempts by States to Collect Debts After Discharge
Even when a state has a claim against a debtor, it may
choose not to file a proof of claim in order to retain its Eleventh
Amendment immunity. In several such cases, states have attempted to collect payment from debtors after the bankruptcy
court has discharged the debts.' These attempts by state officials
clearly violate federal law and thus can be enjoined by the bankruptcy court through the Exparte Young doctrine.

The Bankruptcy Code provides only for discharge of debts owed by individuals, not
corporations. See note 5.
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Enforceability of discharge orders.

Bankruptcy courts have the power to, among other things,
determine the amount or legality of any tax," and discharge any
debts, including debts owed to a state.89 The court's discharge operates as an injunction against judicial proceedings and nonjudicial collection attempts relating to discharged debts.' While
resolution of an adversary proceeding against a state depends on
the court's jurisdiction over the state, the power of the bankruptcy court to discharge debts derives not from jurisdiction over
the state or other creditors. Instead, the power derives from jurisdiction over debtors and their estates as established by the
Bankruptcy Code.9 ' The state may choose not to appear in federal
court, "b]ut that choice carries with it the consequence of foregoing any challenge to the federal court's actions. 2
Indeed, as the Fourth Circuit has observed, a confirmation
order entered by a bankruptcy judge is not a "suit" against one of
the United States for purposes of the Eleventh Amendment.9 In
this sense, a discharge order is distinguishable from an adversary
proceeding by the trustee against a state, in which the state is
the named defendant. The latter action certainly constitutes a
"suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of
the United States" under the Eleventh Amendment, over which
federal courts lack jurisdiction absent waiver by the state.' On
the other hand, a discharge by the bankruptcy court operates as
an injunction against any actions taken to recover discharged
debts,95 and cannot be ignored by state actors.
2.

Use of Exparte Young to enforce discharge orders.

Bankruptcy courts have the power to enter bankruptcy plan
confirmation orders under Section 105(a), provide for the discharge of debts, and issue any order necessary or appropriate to
'a 11 USC § 505(a)(1) (1994). See also Hoffman v Connecticut Department of Income
Maintenance, 492 US 96, 102 (1989) (noting in dicta that the bankruptcy court's determination of the amount or legality of any tax under 11 USC § 505(a)(1) should bind all government units).
The Bankruptcy Code provisions relating to discharge are 11 USC §§ 727, 1141,
1228(a)-(b), 1328(b) (1994).
11 USC § 524(a) (1994).
See Maryland v Antonelli Creditors' Liquidating Trust, 123 F3d 777, 787 (4th Cir
1997) (finding that the bankruptcy court had authority to issue an order exempting certain transfers from state taxes).

2Id.

"Id at 786-87.
"US Const, Amend XI.
"See 11 USC § 524(a)(2).
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carry out the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code.' However,
bankruptcy courts cannot practically enforce those orders without
a mechanism to obtain jurisdiction over the state.9 7 The Ex parte
Young doctrine provides such a tool. Because an attempt to collect a discharged debt violates the injunction established by the
discharge under federal law," courts can employ the Ex parte
Young doctrine to obtain the necessary jurisdiction over the state
official. Moreover, once a court issues an order enjoining a state
official from violating the discharge order under Ex parte Young,
it can enforce that order with its normal contempt powers, because jurisdiction over the state official has already been established."
Despite the availability of the Ex parte Young doctrine to
enjoin violations of the bankruptcy court's orders, at least one
bankruptcy court has not found it proper to assert jurisdiction in
such scenarios. In In re Kish," ° the debtor re-opened her bankruptcy case to determine the status of a debt that the Division of
Motor Vehicles ("DMV"), a state agency, was seeking to collect after it had been discharged by the bankruptcy court. The debtor
named both the DMV and its director in her action. The bankruptcy court found that it had no jurisdiction over the DMV to enforce the discharge order because the DMV, a state agency that
was the real party in interest, would be harmed by such enforcement.'0 ' The court did not explicitly discuss the Ex parte Young

doctrine.
" 11 USC § 105(a) (1994). Similarly, federal courts can invalidate any state laws that
conflict with the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code. In Perez v Campbell, 402 US 637,
639-42, 652 (1971), for example, the Supreme Court struck down an Arizona statute providing that a bankruptcy discharge did not affect a driver's duty to repay damages from an
auto accident. The Court enunciated "the controlling principle that any state legislation
which frustrates the full effectiveness of federal law is rendered invalid by the Supremacy
Clause." Id at 652.
See In re Jacksen, 105 Bankr 542, 544 (9th Cir Bankr App Panel 1989) (holding that
11 USC § 105(a) empowers the bankruptcy court to issue an injunction against attempts
to collect a judgment relating to a discharged debt, but does not broaden the court's jurisdiction over parties, which must be established separately).
11 USC § 524(aX2).
See text accompanying notes 28-30.
1'212 Bankr 808 (D NJ 1997).
...
Id at 814. The judge relied on Regents of the University of Californiav Doe, 117 S Ct
900, 904-05 (1997), for the proposition that "the relevant inquiry for Eleventh Amendment
purposes is whether a state's potential legal rights are affected [by the action]." 212 Bankr
at 814 n 5. Because the discharge of a debt would have an impact on the state's legal
rights, the judge found he did not have jurisdiction to enforce such a discharge. Id at 814.
The court's reliance on Doe is misplaced: Doe did not involve an Exparte Young action, but
rather addressed whether the indemnification of a state agency by someone other than the
state precluded consideration of the agency as an arm of the state for Eleventh Amendment purposes. Doe, 117 S Ct at 904. Thus, Doe does not change Ex parte Young's central
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The better view is that the Ex parte Young doctrine provides
courts with jurisdiction to enforce discharge orders. To hold otherwise would, as Justice Brennan has noted, "exemp[t]... States
from compliance with laws that bind every other legal actor in
our Nation.""°2 Moreover, the Supreme Court has observed that
"[o]ne of the primary purposes of the Bankruptcy Act" is to give
debtors "a new opportunity in life and a clear field for future effort, unhampered by the pressure and discouragement of preexisting debt." °3 This purpose would be undermined if states
were not bound to the bankruptcy court's discharge of debts.
While bankruptcy courts may not entertain adversary suits
against states, they may enter orders that states must obey-for
example, discharging debts or exempting certain transfers from
state tax. Indeed, because states will be held to the discharge
plan approved by the bankruptcy court, this principle may encourage states to file proofs of claim in the bankruptcy proceeding
in order to protect their rights. Such a result would mitigate the
negative effects of the Seminole Tribe decision on bankruptcy
proceedings.
B. Violations of the Automatic Stay'T
The automatic stay provision of the Bankruptcy Code. 5 is an
essential element of the bankruptcy process, preventing creditors
from pursuing their claims against the debtor once a bankruptcy
petition has been filed.0 6 In addition to barring creditors from
seeking to collect debts 7 and suspending judicial, administrative,

premise that prospective injunctive relief may be awarded against state officials.
"0Atascadero, 473 US at 248 (Brennan dissenting).
"Local Loan Co v Hunt, 292 US 234, 244 (1934) (citations omitted).
'" The discussion in this Part is equally applicable to claims under 11 USC § 525
(1994), which prohibits discrimination against a person or entity merely because it is or
has been in bankruptcy or a debtor under the Bankruptcy Code. Just as a violation of the
automatic stay constitutes a violation of federal law, so does discriminating against a
debtor.
" 11 USC § 362. The court has the authority to grant a party relief from the stay in
certain circumstances. 11 USC § 362(d), (f).
1 Congress explained its importance as follows:
The automatic stay is one of the fundamental debtor protections provided by the
bankruptcy laws. It gives the debtor a breathing spell from his creditors. It stops all
collection efforts, all harassment, and all foreclosure actions. It permits the debtor to
attempt a repayment or reorganization plan, or simply to be relieved of the financial
pressures that drove him into bankruptcy.
HR Rep No 595, 95th Cong, 1st Sess 340 (1978), reprinted in 1978 USCCAN 5787, 629697.
1 11 USC § 362(a)(6).
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3 the automatic stay
and other proceedings against the debtor,"
prevents creditors from offsetting money they owe to the debtor
against money the debtor owes to them without leave of the
court."° The filing of a voluntary or involuntary petition under
any chapter of the Bankruptcy Code automatically triggers the
stay. The stay remains in place until the property against which
a claim is being asserted is no longer property of the estate,"' the
case is closed, the case is dismissed, or a discharge is granted or
denied, whichever comes first."' Section 362(a) provides that the
automatic stay applies to all entities, which Congress has defined
to include states."2 Section 362(h) provides, upon violation of the
stay, for the recovery of "actual damages, including costs and attorneys' fees, and, in appropriate circumstances, punitive damages.""
As one commentator has noted, "It]he operation of the automatic stay and ultimately the policies of fair distribution and a
debtor's fresh start are obviated if a state entity may routinely
violate the automatic stay and in effect enjoy a preferential
status in comparison to other creditors by not filing a proof of
claim."" 4 If bankruptcy courts could not obtain jurisdiction over
states violating the automatic stay, inequality in the treatment of
creditors would result in cases in which states collect from the
debtor outside of the bankruptcy process.

1.

Use ofExparte Young to enjoin violations of the
automatic stay.

Like a bankruptcy courts order discharging debts, the automatic stay is an injunction. Debtors and bankruptcy trustees can
bring Ex parte Young actions against the state official violating
the stay to obtain the necessary jurisdiction over the state official
to enjoin the violation. Because under Ex parte Young plaintiffs
are entitled to only prospective injunctive relief, they cannot recover damages." 5 They may, however, recover attorneys' fees." 6
" 11 USC § 362(a)(1).
1 11 USC § 362(a)(7).
11011 USC § 362(cXl).
"'11 USC § 362(c)(2).
I11 USC § 101(15) defines "entity" to include any "governmental unit." 11 USC
§ 101(27) defines "governmental unit" to include "a State."
11311

USC § 362(h).

..Ron S. Chun, Avoiding a JurassicDinosaurRun Amok: Circumventing Eleventh
Amendment Sovereign Immunity to Remedy Violations of the Automatic Stay, 98 Comm L
J 179, 180 (1993).
"'See Part I.B. See also In re Louis; Harris,213 Bankr 796, 798 (Bankr D Corn 1997)
(recognizing that only prospective injunctive relief is available under Exparte Young).
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Bankruptcy courts may enforce their orders; if a state official
violates the injunction issued by the court in the Ex parte Young
action, a court may award damages against him for contempt regarding the court-ordered injunction (as distinguished from damages for the
initial violation of the automatic stay, which are not
11 7
allowed).
While some bankruptcy courts have enjoined state officials
from violating the automatic stay,"" another court has asserted
that it is powerless to enjoin the violation."' This court did not
address the applicability of Ex parte Young to state violations of
the automatic stay; instead it simply asserted that jurisdiction
does not exist in light of Seminole Tribe.2 ° As discussed above, Ex
parte Young remains a viable means of obtaining jurisdiction over
a state official to enjoin a violation of federal law.
2.

Incentives for states to violate the automatic stay.

While an Ex parte Young action can be maintained to enjoin
state officials from violating the automatic stay, the Ex parte
Young doctrine's preclusion of a damage award creates a perverse
incentive for states to violate the automatic stay. Under the current Ex parte Young doctrine, even if the trustee brings an action
against a state official, the worst penalty a federal court can levy
is an injunction and attorneys' fees; the state official is immune
from paying damages. In the meantime, if the state (acting
through the state official) can collect the debt during the automatic stay, it does
not have to turn over the property to the bank2
ruptcy trustee.1 '
However, it is unlikely that states will become rogue creditors who use their Eleventh Amendment immunity to extract aggressively every last penny of their claims from the debtor. Even
if states violate the automatic stay, debtors and trustees can stop
these violations early through the Ex parte Young doctrine,
thereby reducing the benefit to the state of violating the automatic stay in the first place. Moreover, active employment of the
"'See id at 799.
"'See the discussion of enforcement of Exparte Young orders in Part I.B.
..See In re GuidingLight Corp, 213 Bankr 489, 492 (Bankr E D La 1997) (allowing an
Ex parte Young action seeking to enjoin the Louisiana Department of Health and Human
Services to proceed); In re Martinez, 196 Bankr at 229-30 (disallowing monetary damages
against the Department of the Treasury of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico).
"'See In re Lush Lawns, Inc, 203 Bankr 418, 420-21 (Bankr N D Ohio 1996) (finding
enjoinment to be a contempt proceeding, not an Ex parte Young action, and so declining to
find jurisdiction).
"2Id at 421.

"'See Part IV.C.
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Ex parte Young doctrine may discourage states from invoking
Eleventh Amendment immunity in the first place, because the
consequence could be litigation against state officials.'2 2 Where
the state has indemnified the state official, it will have to pay the
costs of the ensuing litigation, providing a further disincentive to
violating the automatic stay.
C. Turnover of Property Obtained by the State
An issue related to enjoining violations of the automatic stay
involves the bankruptcy court's ability to require that a state return to the estate property held in violation of the bankruptcy
laws. Two specific instances deserve attention: property received
by the state in a preferential transfer and property received by
the state in a fraudulent conveyance."
The Bankruptcy Code provides that conveyances made
within ninety days of the filing of a bankruptcy petition, termed
"preferential transfers," must generally be returned to the bankruptcy trustee. 124 Similarly, transfers made by the debtor with an
intent to defraud or made for less than fair value ("fraudulent
conveyances") must also be turned over to the trustee."2s These
provisions are designed to ensure that all creditors receive their
fair share of the bankruptcy estate. Allowing the state to retain
such transfers would reduce the assets available to other creditors, thus compromising the goals of equitable treatment of all
creditors and maximization of the assets of the bankruptcy estate. Allowing retention may also create incentives for states to
accelerate their collection processes. Unfortunately, while bankruptcy policy concerns support forcing turnover of the property,

"fSeeIn re Lazar,200 Bankr at 383 ("he principal effect of the Seminole decision, in
the bankruptcy context, may be to convert litigation against a state... into litigation

against the applicable state officers.").
InThe analysis in this Part also applies to transfers made in violation of the automatic
stay. Such transfers are unlikely to occur, however, because once the debtor enters bankruptcy, the trustee controls the assets of the bankruptcy estate. The trustee, aware of his
rights under the Bankruptcy Code, will not consent to such transfers and can bring an Ex
parte Young action to enjoin any state collection efforts.
12 11 USC §§ 547, 550 (1994). Transfers made in the ordinary course of business are
not preferential transfers. 11 USC § 547(cX2XB).
11 USC §§ 548,550. While the more common case will involve preferential transfers,
fraudulent conveyances to states may also arise. For example, in United States v Nordic
Village, Inc, 503 US 30, 31 (1992), a case involving federal sovereign immunity, an officer
of a bankrupt corporation withdrew money from its account to pay his own federal tax liability. The Court refused to permit the bankruptcy court jurisdiction over the Internal
Revenue Service to recover the fraudulent transfer, on the grounds that the Bankruptcy
Code did not "establish unambiguously" that Congress intended to abrogate sovereign

immunity with respect to monetary claims. Id at 34.
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Ex parte Young's requirement that relief be only prospective precludes bankruptcy courts from using Ex parte Young to obtain jurisdiction over the state to force the turnover of the property. An
exception to this rule exists where the state does not hold clear title to the property-for example, property seized pursuant to a
lien, but not yet sold.
1.

Use of Exparte Young to achieve turnover.

In order to avoid the inequitable results described above,
courts could characterize return of the property as prospective
relief for purposes of the Ex parte Young doctrine on the ground
that only through such return could the compliance with federal
law be restored."6 Under this view, because the state in holding
the property affects the distribution of assets into the future, the
relevant state official is in continuing violation of the Bankruptcy
Code. Remedying this violation would require turnover of the
property.
While such a conception would best serve the goals of the
bankruptcy process, it runs afoul of the Supreme Court's conception of "prospective relief" in Ex parte Young actions. In Ford Motor Co v Department of Treasury of Indiana,27 the Court established that "when the action is in essence one for the recovery of
money from the state, the state is the real, substantial party in
interest and is entitled to invoke its sovereign immunity from
suit even, though individual officers are nominal defendants."
Similarly, in Edelman v Jordan," the Supreme Court held that
payment of benefits withheld from citizens in violation of federal
law did not need to be paid retroactively to the citizens. The
Court reasoned that, because the funds to satisfy the award must
come from the state treasury, such payment resembled more
closely the monetary relief against the state prohibited by Ford
than the prospective relief in Ex parte Young.'2 9 Similarly, because the return of property obtained by a state in violation of the
Bankruptcy Code must come from the state treasury, the Ex
parte Young doctrine cannot be used to force turnover.
One might argue that the bankruptcy situation is distinguishable from Edelman on the ground that the property involved
once belonged to the debtor and was kept in violation of federal
law, while the denied benefits in Edelman were never the prop-

'For a similar argument, see In re Colon, 114 Bankr at 897.
12323

US 459, 464 (1945).

'"415 US 651, 668-69 (1974).
'"Id at 665-66 & n 11.
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erty of the citizens. Such a distinction is not tenable, however, as
turnover in both situations requires payment from the state
treasury, which the Ex parte Young doctrine forbids.
One particular bankruptcy situation is distinguishable from
Edelman: turnover of property seized by the state to which the
state does not have title. In United States v Whiting Pools, Inc, 3 '
which involved federal sovereign immunity, the Supreme Court
allowed the bankruptcy trustee to recover tangible personal property seized by the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS"). In authorizing the turnover, the Court emphasized that the IRS did not have
title to the property, but rather held a lien on the property. 31
Similarly, in In re Mt. Moriah Elevator, Inc,"2 the bankruptcy
court allowed the trustee to recover property of the estate that
the state was holding in an escrow account. The court stressed
that the money was not being paid from the state treasury."
Therefore, if the state does not have title to the seized property,
the judge can order its turnover.
Some lower courts, relying primarily on policy reasons, have
asserted jurisdiction over states to require them to turn over
property held by the state under the bankruptcy laws." One
court, ordering the return of property obtained in violation of the
automatic stay, justified its order by noting that:
The return of [funds recovered by the State in violation of
the automatic stay] to the estate is essential if the fundamental bankruptcy principles embodied in the automatic
stay (i.e. debtor relief and creditor equality) are to have
meaning.... The return of such funds is not merely compen-

satory to the debtor; it also restores compliance with federal
law and vindicates the bankruptcy stay."
13462 US 198, 208-11 (1983).
"'Id at 210-11. The Court also limited its holding to situations in which the recovery of
the property was necessary to facilitate the rehabilitation of the debtor's business. Id at
208 n 17.
1- 143 Bankr 905, 911-12 (Bankr W D Mo 1992).

"=Idat 911. See also In re Groves, 120 Bankr 956, 964-65 (Bankr N D 11 1990) (holding that a turnover by a state pension system of the debtor's interest in the fund that the
court determined was property of the estate was not a money judgment, but more closely
resembled injunctive or declaratory relief); In re James, 120 Bankr 802, 812-13 (E D Pa

1990), revd on other grounds, 940 F2d 46 (3d Cir 1991) (holding that funds seized by the
state must be turned over to the bankruptcy estate where the state had not received title
to the funds prior to the filing of the bankruptcy petition, distinguishing such a turnover
from a money judgment against the state).
"See, for example, In re Zywiczynski, 210 Bankr 924, 925-26 (Bankr W D NY 1997)
(holding that the bankruptcy court had jurisdiction over the state to determine if an Ex
parte Young action applied to turnover situation).
"See In re Colon, 114 Bankr at 897.
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Yet, while use of the Ex parte Young doctrine to mandate
turnover of property would best serve the policies of bankruptcy,
such considerations cannot outweigh the constitutional limitations established by the Supreme Court. The Court has repeatedly made clear its requirement that relief in Ex parte Young actions be prospective only."6 The return of property obtained in
violation of the Bankruptcy Code cannot be termed "prospective
relief" apart from the Whiting Pools scenario, and therefore cannot be distinguished from the Supreme Court's refusal in Edelman to award retroactive benefits withheld in violation of federal
law. While the result may be that states receive a disproportionate share of the bankruptcy assets relative to other unsecured
creditors-a result that undermines one of the bankruptcy regime's twin goals-it is dictated by the jurisdictional requirements of the Eleventh Amendment as interpreted by the Supreme Court.
2.

Incentives for states to obtain preferential transfers.
Given the limited usefulness of the Ex parte Young doctrine
in this context, states may take advantage of the situation by
trying to obtain preferential transfers from the debtor. Creditors
must generally turn over to the bankruptcy estate all transfers
received from the debtor within ninety days of the filing of the
bankruptcy petition."7 The incentives for states to collect such
preferential transfers are unclear in light of bankruptcy courts'
inability to force turnover. On the one hand, states may have an
incentive to accelerate their collection practices. As the Seventh
Circuit explained in In re McVey Trucking, Inc:38
If the federal courts were not able to order a state to turn
over assets to a bankruptcy estate, then any state owed
money by a debtor having financial problems would have a
strong incentive to collect whatever funds it believed to be
due as rapidly as possible--even if this pushed the debtor
into insolvency-rather than risking the possibility of recovering only a portion of their debt in any subsequent bankruptcy proceeding. In effect, we would be holding that the
Constitution makes a state a preferred creditor in every
bankruptcy. The very existence of this power would doubtless encourage other creditors to accelerate their collections.
The end result would be an increase in bankruptcies and a
" See text accompanying notes 24-25.
11 USC §§ 347(bX4XA), 550(a).
' 812 F2d 311 (7th Cir 1987).
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distortion of the system of preferences that Congress has
carefully crafted. 3 9
On the other hand, it is unclear whether state agencies will
have either the information necessary to identify individuals and
corporations that pose a bankruptcy risk, or the tools to seek to
collect aggressively as much money as possible prior to their filing of a bankruptcy petition. Perhaps states will undertake accelerated collection with respect to individuals or corporations that
have large liabilities; however, these groups are likely to be more
sophisticated and aware of their option to refuse to pay. If, however, states in practice accelerate their collection practices postSeminole Tribe, other creditors' incentives could be altered in two
ways. First, if creditors perceive that preferential transfers to
states diminish assets available to them in bankruptcy proceedings, they can charge higher interest rates or alter other credit
terms ex ante to compensate for this risk. Ex post, if a creditor
thinks that the debtor is about to make a payment to the state, it
can attempt to force the debtor into bankruptcy before the payment is made,'40 thus triggering the automatic stay, which precludes collection by the state.' A creditor would need detailed information about the debtor's financial situation and plans to pay
the state in order to take such steps. 4 Ultimately, resolution of
this issue is an empirical question, but this indeterminacy should
alleviate concerns that states will aggressively accelerate collections as a result of Seminole Tribe.
D. Claims by the Debtor Against the State
In the course of a bankruptcy proceeding, a debtor will often
have a claim against the state. For example, in a number of cases
debtors have sought refunds of overpayments to state agencies
made in the ordinary course of business.' If a state has not filed
a proof of claim or otherwise waived its Eleventh Amendment

"NId at 328.
"0The creditor could either exert pressure on the debtor to file for bankruptcy, or could
force the debtor into bankruptcy pursuant to an involuntary filing. See 11 USC § 303
(1994).
.See Part W.B.
...
Moreover, claims by states for taxes receive priority over other claims in bankruptcy. See 11 USC § 507(a)(8) (1994). If the payment to the state involved such taxes, the
creditor would not have an incentive to accelerate filing of a bankruptcy petition, because
the state claim would have priority over the other creditors' claims.
'"See, for example, In re NVR, 206 Bankr at 835 (involving refund of taxes paid); In re
Charter Oak, 203 Bankr at 19-20 (involving repayment of rent, property insurance, and
property taxes relating to services rendered to the state by the debtor).
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immunity, bankruptcy courts will not have jurisdiction to adjudicate such claims.
Unfortunately, from the perspective of the bankruptcy regime, there is little that the courts can do to mitigate this problem in light of Seminole Tribe. As discussed above, Ex parte
Young actions require a violation of federal law; most of these
types of claims will involve state law. Moreover, even if a violation of federal law exists, the Ex parte Young doctrine provides
only for prospective injunctive relief, and does not allow for the
return of money from the state treasury. A liberal application of
the same transaction or occurrence test may be useful in obtaining jurisdiction over some of these claims, but requires first that
some state agency has filed a proof of claim.
Of course, if a bankruptcy court cannot obtain jurisdiction
over a state, suit with respect to these types of claims can still be
brought in state court. 28 USC § 1334(b) provides the federal
courts "original but not exclusive jurisdiction of all civil proceedings arising under title 11,"144 "or arising in or related to cases
under title 11."' 5 However, this nonexclusivity does not fully resolve the issue. Trustees may lack the resources to bring suit in
state court.146 Furthermore, adjudication of claims in state court
undermines one of the primary attributes of the Bankruptcy
Code: establishment of an efficient debt collection mechanism. 147
To the extent the debtor is unable to obtain speedy (or any) resolution of a claim against a state in state court, creditors will have
fewer assets to divide. Despite both of these problems with pursuing claims in state court, the fact remains that ultimately the
trustee has an avenue for recovery in state courts to collect on
these claims from the state, though perhaps with a loss of efficiency. In contrast, the trustee has no ability to force turnover of
property obtained as a preferential transfer or fraudulent conveyance.
'"Title 11 of the US Code contains the bankruptcy provisions.
14 28 USC § 1334(b) (1994).
'See, for example, In re Zywiczynski, 210 Bankr at 925 (noting that the trustee had
no resources to bring suit in state court, or even pay the filing fee).
...
See Douglas G. Baird and Thomas H. Jackson, CorporateReorganizations and the
Treatment of Diverse Ownership Interests:A Comment on Adequate Protection of Secured
Creditorsin Bankruptcy, 51 U Chi L Rev 97, 100-01 (1984) (asserting that the primary
goal of bankruptcy is as an efficient debt collection mechanism). One scholar, however, has
noted that "[t]he fact that a debtor or trustee may have to seek relief in state court is only
extraordinary when viewed in the narrow bankruptcy context; in the broader context, it is
perfectly consistent with the relationship between the states and the federal government."
Patricia L. Barsalou, Defining the Limits of Federal Court Jurisdictionover States in
Bankruptcy Court, 28 St Mary's L J 575, 623 (1997). Nonetheless, the requirement that
debtors bring their claims in state court impairs the efficiency ofthe bankruptcy process.
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CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court's decision in Seminole Tribe has complicated the bankruptcy process by allowing states to invoke their
Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit in bankruptcy courts.
In some instances, this invocation of immunity threatens to undermine both the efficiency and fairness of the bankruptcy process by in effect making states preferred creditors.
Courts may employ various tools to obtain jurisdiction over
states in bankruptcy courts and mitigate the negative effects of
Seminole Tribe. In certain cases, states waive their Eleventh
Amendment immunity by filing a proof of claim in the bankruptcy proceeding. Courts should liberally apply the same transaction or occurrence test to determine the scope of the waiver.
Courts can also employ the Ex parte Young doctrine to enjoin
state officials who are violating provisions of the Bankruptcy
Code, such as the automatic stay or the discharge of debts.
The only area where the implications of Seminole Tribe leave
the debtor and the trustee without any remedy against a state
involves the lack of jurisdiction of bankruptcy courts over states
to force turnover of property obtained in violation of the Bankruptcy Code. As a result of this inability, other creditors will have
fewer assets to share. Nonetheless, this issue does not pose a serious threat to the bankruptcy process. In the preferential transfer context, states will not likely have the resources or information to accelerate aggressively debt collection from potential
bankrupts. In terms of the automatic stay, the bankruptcy court
can employ the Ex parte Young doctrine to enjoin violations before transfers occur. These considerations indicate that in this
context, the state is not likely to have a significant advantage
over other creditors.
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